I hear a lot of interesting stories in my line of work:  there are as many interesting employment law problems as there are interesting people, which is to say, a lot.  A recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit encapsulates this variety nicely, and serves as a reminder not to disregard unorthodox employee requests.

In EEOC v. Consol Energy, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Consol Energy on behalf of one of Consol’s employees, Beverly K. Butcher.  Mr. Butcher worked diligently for Consol Energy for 37 years when his employer decided to install a biometric hand scanner to track employee attendance.    Consol required each employee to have his or her hand scanned, and then, upon entering or departing the workplace, required the employee to wave the hand over the scanner.  

Mr. Butcher identifies as a devout evangelical Christian.  While the hand scanner seems like a fairly innocent and efficient way to track employees, Mr. Butcher did not see it that way.  Mr. Butcher’s faith informed his belief in an Antichrist, whose followers are condemned to everlasting punishment.  The followers of the Antichrist are identified by the Mark of the Beast.  Mr. Butcher feared that the use of the hand scanner would result in his receiving the Mark of the Beast.  No one disputed that Mr. Butcher’s belief were sincerely held.  Indeed, Mr. Butcher resigned rather than submit to the new hand scanning rules, after his employer failed to accommodate his request.

The EEOC sued on Mr. Butcher’s behalf, arguing that the failure to accommodate Mr. Butcher’s sincerely held religious belief violated Mr. Butcher’s civil rights.  A federal jury in West Virginia returned a verdict in excess of $550,000 in Mr. Butcher’s favor, finding that Consol had constructively discharged Mr. Butcher in violation of his rights to accommodations for his religious beliefs.   For want of a simple accommodation, Consol Energy risked a verdict in excess of a $550,000, not to mention the related legal fees and expenses.  Interestingly, Consol does not appear to have offered any operational reason for its failure to accommodate: other employees were permitted to clock in by entering their personnel numbers into a keypad, without additional cost or burden to the company.  Indeed, email produced in the case seems to indicate that the employer was scoffing at the religious objection.  

It would have been cheap and easy for Consol to accommodate the request.  The failure to do so appears to be based on a judgment about the validity of the request.  This type of fact pattern presents itself often in many contexts:  religious accommodations, disability accommodations, requests for medical leave.  It is easy, as Consol Energy appears to have done, to disregard requests as “kooky” or “odd.”  This is a mistake.  If the accommodation is not needed, or is overburdensome, or is not based in fact, that will come out in the accommodation process.  The danger lies in not following the process that such a request, however strange, requires.  Certainly, it is well worth the effort in the beginning to avoid the stress and expense of litigation later.

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal reported that Senators are considering a tax on employer-sponsored health insurance plans to raise revenue.  It is not my intention to discuss the politics of this proposal, and instead, I write to consider how such a proposal would alter the economics of recruiting and retaining employees.
 
Until now, it went without question that those who secured health insurance through their employers did so on a pre-tax basis.  Employers, for their part, can deduct the cost.  This incentivizes employers to offer health insurance coverage to employees as part of a compensation package.  Health benefits are hugely important to employees when deciding whether to accept new positions.  As such, these plans are powerful recruitment and retention tools. 

In my practice, time and again, I hear that talented and experienced employees do not want to leave their current employment, not because of well-drafted restrictive covenants (as many employers believe), but because of their compensation package, that includes health insurance.  Spouses and children may have medical conditions that require care, and employees resist the stress of leaving behind good coverage for new jobs or self-employment. Employees believe, in many cases correctly, that the cost of health insurance is cheaper through employer-subsidized plans than in the individual market, and that they can get better coverage for their dollar through their employer. 

This is particularly true right now, as the healthcare debate rages on, and employees feel insecure about how their health insurance will work in the future.  The Senate’s proposal would remove a tool from an employer’s recruitment arsenal, and dramatically change the economics of recruiting and retaining talented employees.  Of course, employers have other tools, and should not rely totally on health insurance, but it is hard to overstate the importance of this coverage to employees.  The implementation of such a tax would mean that employers would need to reconfigure compensation packages and rethink the manner in which they provide health insurance coverage to employees.

Lawmakers have referred to the tax-favored treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance plans as discriminatory to those who purchase their health insurance individually.  Interestingly, removing these tax protections would also remove the incentive for employers to provide such healthcare.  It would be interesting to know from these lawmakers if that is what they intend.  A move away from employer-sponsored health insurance does not just change the economics of the employment relationship; it changes the economics of healthcare. 

Of course, the healthcare debate impacts employer / employee relationships even as the status of the Affordable Care Act and employer-sponsored health insurance remains unclear.  It is simply impossible for employers, or for their lawyers for that matter, to plan for changes in healthcare while proposals are floated and then rejected by lawmakers.  However, the proposal to end the tax-favored treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance would mark a radical change.  It will be interesting to see if it makes its way out of the pages of the Wall Street Journal. 

Let’s check in with the January 2017 case filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas challenging the Obama Administration’s proposed changes to overtime regulations.  Those regulations would have required employers to reclassify many employees considered exempt from overtime rules to non-exempt status, requiring the employer to now pay overtime to those employees. The rule was widely considered a boon to employees, but a burden for small businesses and nonprofits. 

Those rules would have required that in addition to meeting certain requirements with regard to an employee’s duties, the employee must also earn a minimum salary of $47,476 to qualify for “exempt” status.  The current rule requires that the employee earn a minimum salary of $23,660.  The dramatic increase in the salary requirement caused employers to reevaluate classifications and to generate new policies regarding overtime and work hours in advance of a December 1, 2016 deadline.

As previously discussed on this blog, on November 22, 2016, the Eastern District of Texas entered an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the new rules.  Many clients have asked me, dreading the answer, whether that injunction remains in place.  On December 1, 2016, the United States Department of Labor appealed the injunction order, and sought a stay of the Court’s order prohibiting enforcement.  The Court denied the stay, and the matter is now on appeal.  During the appeal, the Department of Labor cannot enforce the new rules.  The appeals court granted a request submitted by the Department of Justice to extend time to file appellate briefs while “incoming leadership personnel” considered the issues.  That brief is now due on June 30. 

The Trump Administration has three choices: defend the rule, withdraw the rule, or rewrite the rule.  Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta has telegraphed that a review of the rule was necessary, but that the salary increase was too dramatic.  However, the Department of Labor’s repeated requests for extensions to file a brief indicate that it is not necessarily an easy call.  For example, because the Eastern District’s order granting the injunction called into question the rulemaking authority of the Department of Labor, there may be good reason for the administration to challenge the court’s injunction order, even though it does not necessarily agree with the rule. 

The overtime rules will remain in limbo until at least June 30, 2017.  We will continue to monitor the situation.  In the meantime, employers are not required to change their overtime policies or the classifications of their employees. 
 

By Patricia Collins, Esquire
 

On May 2, 2017, the House passed the Working Families Flexibility Act.  The purpose of the Act is to give employees flexibility in how they choose to be paid for overtime: in wages or in compensatory time off.  The Act crystallizes a tension I see often in my representation of employers. 

 Presently, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires employers to pay nonexempt employees overtime compensation for work hours in excess of 40 in a workweek.  Employers cannot compensate employees for those overtime hours in compensatory time off (“comp time”).  Such a policy violates the FLSA, exposing the employer to liability for the unpaid overtime hours as well as penalties and attorney’s fees.

 The FLSA prohibition against payment in comp time is intended to protect employees from abusive overtime demands by employers.  The statutory obligation to pay additional wages for hours over forty in a workweek, so the argument goes, forces the employer to base the decision to require overtime hours on business and financial considerations.  The FLSA’s ban on comp time legislates a policy determination that offering comp time will not protect employees from abusive demands by employers.

 Republicans this week argued otherwise.  They argue that permitting employees to take comp time rather than payment for overtime work gives employees flexibility.    Democrats who opposed the bill countered that the Act’s provision allowing employers the final say does not adequately protect employees. 

 Practically, the Act sits at the tipping point of many competing considerations:  employers want to establish policies that comply with the law, protect the business, and benefit employees.  Employees want flexibility, but they also need to be paid for their work.  The reality is that banked comp time can be a liability for employers because there are jobs for which attendance is extremely important, and unscheduled or unpredictable time is off is sometimes expensive or interferes with the progress of work.  Further, employees might not be free to use that comp time in the manner they would like if it interferes with the employer’s business.  Most employers offer paid time off in a set amount, in order to create predictability as to an employee’s attendance.  While this proposed rule might create flexibility and reduce overtime costs, I do wonder whether it is really a savings in the long run. 

 It will be interesting to see how the Senate balances these concerns, and whether employers will create policies that allow comp time.  The bill now goes to the Senate – no word yet on whether they will vote on it. Stay tuned!

By Patricia Collins

Reprinted with permission from the February 28th edition of the The Legal Intelligencer © 2017 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.Further duplication without permission is prohibited

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Metalico Pittsburgh v. Newman, et al (No. 354 WDA 2016, April 19, 2017), dealt a blow to employees attempting to avoid the application of a non-solicitation covenant. 

In Metalico, two employees, Newman and Medred, executed employment agreements containing a covenant not to solicit customers, suppliers and employees during the “Post-Employment Period.”  The Post-Employment Period varied depending upon the manner of the termination of employment, and commenced upon the last day of employment with Metalico.  At the end of the three-year period, Metalico terminated the employment agreements, but continued to retain Newman and Medred as “at-will” employees, and recited new compensation and other terms of employment.  These terms differed from those contained in the employment agreement.  Newman and Medred were terminated one year later.  Metalico filed suit against Newman and Medred, alleging that they were violating the non-solicitation covenant in their subsequent employment. 

On the eve of a preliminary injunction hearing, Newman and Medred filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that the employment agreements containing the non-solicitation covenants had terminated, and therefore the non-solicitation provisions no longer applied.  They argued that the agreement to continue as “at-will” employees acted as a novation of the employment agreement.

The trial court agreed with Newman and Medred, and granted their motion for partial summary judgment.  But the Superior Court did not agree.  Instead, the Superior Court found that the covenant remained in place pursuant to a survival provision in the employment agreement.  That provision stated that if employment under the agreement “expires,” the agreement continues in effect “as is necessary or appropriate to enforce” the non-solicitation covenant. 

The trial court found that upon converting Newman’s and Medred’s status to “at will” employees, the parties had stated new terms for the employment relationship going forward.  In so doing, the parties did not recite that the non-solicitation provision would stay in place.  The failure to continue the compensation and benefits provided in the employment agreement, in the trial court’s view, invalidated the non-solicitation covenant.  The trial court justly noted: “Metalico cannot claim the benefits of its bargain while denying its employees the same.” 

The Superior Court disagreed, noting that because the survival language was included in the employment agreement, it constituted the bargained-for benefit for the employees.  The Superior Court rejected any argument that there was a failure of consideration, because failure of consideration only applies if the consideration was never received – the employees here did receive three years of the promised compensation and benefits under the agreement.  The Superior Court refused to find that the parties to the employment agreement intended to terminate and extinguish the previous agreement, thus extinguishing the non-solicitation covenant as well.  In so doing, the Superior Court relied upon Boyce v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 580 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. 1990).  However, the Boyce case dealt with the use of the restrictive covenant as a defense to a claim raised by the employee.

It is well-settled that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are disfavored under Pennsylvania law.  Courts, including the Superior Court, have refused to enforce such agreements on technicalities.  For example, in Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc., 99 A.3d 928 (Pa. Super. 2014), the Superior Court refused to enforce a covenant not to compete in an employment agreement entered into after the commencement of employment and not accompanied by any beneficial change in the employee’s status, but which recited that it was signed “under seal” under the Uniform Written Obligations Act.  The Court found that a seal does not provide adequate consideration to enforce a restrictive covenant.  Instead, the Superior Court noted, there must be “actual valuable consideration.”  The holding in Socko left employment law practitioners and litigators with the belief that there are no “gotchas” when it comes to restrictive covenants. 

Metalico appears to change that.  Metalico voluntarily agreed to let the employment agreement terminate and to continue employment on an “at-will” basis.  This change of status benefits Metalico, leaving it free to terminate the employees or change their compensation and benefits at will (thus the name) and without concern about the terms of a written agreement.  The employees lost these protections.  The practical result of the Superior Court’s holding is that the employees lost the protections of the agreement, but retained their post-employment obligations.  This is inconsistent with Pennsylvania’s historical animosity towards these restrictive covenants, and appears to truly represent a “gotcha” for these employees. 

Metalico expands the universe of enforceable restrictive covenants.  This is not an uncommon fact pattern, and one which might have given an employer’s attorney pause prior to filing for a preliminary injunction in the past.  The holding could have the impact of reducing the care required in drafting, terminating and enforcing disfavored restrictive covenants, and eliminating some of the defenses available to employees seeking to avoid the covenant.  Interestingly, nowhere in the opinion does the Superior Court recite the oft-cited language that such covenants are disfavored in the law.  It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court takes the opportunity to do so on appeal. 

Patricia Collins is a Partner with Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP, based in Doylestown, PA. Her practice focuses primarily on commercial litigation, employment and health care law. To learn more about the firm or Patricia Collins, visit www.ammlaw.com.

Employers have been working to comply with new overtime rules issued by the United States Department of Labor that raise the salary level in order to meet certain exemptions from overtime rules before a December 1, 2016 deadline.  Those rules require that in addition to meeting certain requirements with regard to an employee’s duties, the employee must also earn a minimum salary of $47,476.  The old rule required that the employee earn a minimum salary of $23,660.  The dramatic increase in the salary requirement caused employers to reevaluate classifications and to generate new policies regarding overtime and work hours.

 On November 22, 2016, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, temporarily barring the Department of Labor from enforcing the new overtime rule.  The order will remain in place pending a full hearing on the issue.  While the order is temporary, as a prerequisite to entering the order, the Court was required to find that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the argument that the DOL exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule.  So, there is some indication that the Court may bar enforcement of the new rules permanently. 

 For now, employers are temporarily relieved of the obligation to comply with the new rules by the December 1, 2016 deadline.  Because the outcome is not guaranteed, employers should have their new policies ready to go, but do not need to implement them on December 1.  It is simply too early to say whether employers should “shelve” those new policies.  We will have to wait for the Court’s final ruling.   Stay tuned to this space as the case unfolds. 

Patricia Collins is an employment and litigation Partner at Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP and chair of the labor and employment practice group.

By Patricia C. Collins, Esquire Reprinted with permission from the April 24, 2016 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2016 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding electronically stored information present challenging procedural and substantive issues for parties to litigation.  More practically, and, in most cases as a threshold issue, they present cost challenges for litigants.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reviewed whether the costs related to electronic discovery are taxable to the losing party under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) in Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 15-1865 (March 21, 2016). 

28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (“Section 1920”) permits a judge or clerk of court to tax as costs the fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.    The prevailing party would include those costs in a bill of costs and the amount would be included in the judgment or decree.  This provision is at the heart of the dispute in Camesi.    In that case, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (“UPMC”) prevailed in a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  The case involved extensive discovery after the grant of conditional certification under the FLSA.  That discovery included the conditional class’s request for electronically stored information (“ESI”).  There were multiple motions to compel and for protective orders, resulting in the entry of a consent order that stayed further discovery of ESI until the Court ruled on competing motions to certify or decertify the conditional class.

In Roman v. McGuire Memorial, the Pennsylvania Superior Court announced a new basis for challenging terminations of at-will employees.  While Pennsylvania law has always recognized a “public policy” exception to at-will employment, the case law has limited that exception.  Roman expands the exception to include terminations of health-care workers who refuse to work mandatory overtime.
 
Roman worked as a direct care worker, subject to McGuire Memorial’s mandatory overtime requirement.  She was an at-will employee.  The mandatory overtime policy allowed for termination of employees who refused to work mandatory overtime on four occasions. McGuire terminated Roman’s employment after her (disputed) fourth refusal, and Roman sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  After a nonjury trial, the trial court found in Roman’s favor, awarded her $121,869.93 in back pay and lost benefits, and ordered reinstatement to her former position.
 
Relevant to the dispute is Pennsylvania’s Prohibition of Excessive Overtime Act (43 P.S. § 932.1 et seq.).  The Act prohibits a health care facility from requiring employees to work in excess of an “agreed to or previously determined and regularly scheduled daily work shift.”  43 P.S. § 932.3(a)(1).  Further, the Act prohibits retaliation against an employee who refuses to accept work in excess of those limitations.  43 P.S. § 932.3(b).  The Act does not provide for a remedy for employees terminated in violation of its requirements.  It does contemplate a regulatory scheme to address complaints by employees, but those regulations are not yet final.
 
The Superior Court held that the Act established a public policy that healthcare facilities should not require its direct care workers to work overtime hours, and, as such, Roman’s termination for refusing to work overtime hours amounted to wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  Further, the Court distinguished cases in which it had refused to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine because a statute had already created a remedial scheme to address violations of the particular policy identified in that statute, such as the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.  In the case of the Prohibition of Excessive Overtime in Health Care Act, there existed no remedial scheme to address the wrong.
 
The Superior Court has thus used The Act to identify a new public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.  Health care entities should be mindful of this exception in creating and enforcing overtime policies for direct care workers. 

Reprinted with permission from the September 28, 2015 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2015 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

In a precedential opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed an award of punitive damages awarded by a jury in a dispute between two businesses. Brand Marketing Group LLC v. Intertek Testing Services, No. 14-3010 (Sept. 10, 2015), addressed two issues of first or limited impression relating to punitive damages. First, the Third Circuit held that juries may award punitive damages in negligent misrepresentation claims. Second, the Third Circuit considered whether courts may consider harm to the public, rather than harm to the plaintiff only, in awarding punitive damages. As the dissent in Brand Marketing noted, the Third Circuit's decision creates some interesting risks and strategies for commercial disputes.

Brand Marketing Group LLC developed vent-free heaters known as Thermablasters. Brand contracted with a manufacturing company to manufacture the heaters, and a testing company, Intertek Testing Services N.A. Inc., to perform testing for the Thermablasters pursuant to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. Brand entered into a contract with Ace Hardware Corp. to buy 3,980 Thermablasters for $467,000. Intertek then performed the testing on the heaters and found that they met the applicable ANSI standard. The heaters were delivered to Ace Hardware. Ace halted sales after discovering that the heaters, in fact, failed to meet the applicable ANSI standard. Ace sued Brand and obtained a judgment for $611,060. Brand then filed a claim against Intertek.

Brand prevailed on its negligent misrepresentation claim after a three-day trial. The jury awarded $725,000 in past compensatory damages, $320,000 in future compensatory damages, and $5 million in punitive damages. The jury found that Intertek negligently misrepresented it had the necessary expertise to test the heaters. Relevant to the issue of punitive damages, the jury found, after instruction by the court, that Intertek acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others.

The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Intertek's post-trial motions, and thus the jury award of $5 million in punitive damages. In so doing, the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would allow an award of punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation claims, noting there existed no precedent for treating negligent misrepresentation claims differently from general negligence claims for purposes of awarding punitive damages.

However, this holding is not the most interesting part of the case. The Third Circuit next examined whether courts could consider harm to the public in general in awarding punitive damages, or whether the court must limit its analysis to damage to the plaintiff. In this case, Brand experienced financial harm only (Intertek did assert, without success, that the economic loss doctrine barred Brand's claim). No consumer experienced an accident or injury as a result of the testing failure. Intertek argued that an award of punitive damages violated the due process clause under these facts because the jury should not consider potential harm to consumers, and must only consider harm to Brand, in awarding punitive damages. The court found that this issue was "not settled by precedent." The Third Circuit analyzed the case law to conclude that courts may only consider instances of misconduct by the defendant in evaluating a punitive damages award where the conduct is of the same sort as the conduct that injured the plaintiff. The court rejected Intertek's argument that applicable law prohibited consideration of potential public harm in reviewing an award of punitive damages, and found that, in this case, potential public harm was "directly tied" to the harm to the plaintiff. The Third Circuit likewise found that the fact that no one was physically injured by the Thermablasters did not matter, stating that Intertek "should not be rewarded" for the fact the risk did not come to fruition. Thus, Brand stands for the proposition that a court may consider potential harm to the public in reviewing an award of punitive damages as long as the potential harm is directly tied to the injury to the plaintiff.

In his dissent, Judge D. Michael Fisher opined that if an "admission of imperfection" or a "lack of absolute uniformity" allows for an award of punitive damages whenever something goes wrong, "Pennsylvania companies may be in for a rude awakening." Indeed, as Fisher notes, the Brand decision will create new strategies and areas of risk for businesses involved in commercial disputes. Brand represents, at its most basic level, a commercial dispute—a dispute between businesses regarding a failure of one party to do what that entity contractually agreed to do. Interestingly, Brand did not assert that it was entitled to punitive damages as a result of intentional and outrageous conduct of Intertek, but instead proved to the jury that Intertek's "reckless disregard" for a known risk to safety justified punitive damages. Of course, the jury heard evidence that it concluded met the standard, but the application of the standard to a business dispute is an interesting one. Presumably, this standard would have relevance in any business tort case where a failure occurs in, for example, manufacturing or testing products.

Procedurally, Brand allows for the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury, and, arguably, expands the factors a jury may consider in awarding punitive damages in the context of a business tort, but Brand does not mean that a plaintiff will prevail on the issue. It goes without saying that the threat alone may be enough. Brand's strategy in asserting a claim for negligent misrepresentation (and not, for example, breach of contract) created the opportunity to plead and prove punitive damages. Brand was also fortunate to have sufficient facts to overcome the application of the economic loss doctrine. The Third Circuit's opinion in this case supports that strategy by allowing punitive damages in a negligent misrepresentation case and by allowing the consideration of potential (related) harm to the public. In this way, the Third Circuit has created another tool in the commercial litigation arsenal. It will be interesting to see whether courts in the future limit the application of this case to its facts, or if it marks a dramatic change in the available remedies for business torts. •

Plan B:  Litigating Non-Solicitation Provisions

By Patricia C. Collins, Esquire
Reprinted with permission from December 12, 2013 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c)
2013 ALM Media Propeties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

Increasingly, employers and their attorneys meet resistance when seeking to enforce covenants not to compete.  States such as Georgia and California continue to refuse to honor those restrictions. Even in states that recognize the validity of such agreements, Courts can restrict the geographic or temporal scope of the agreement, refuse to find sufficient irreparable harm to permit the entry of a temporary or preliminary injunction, or find other equitable grounds to refuse to enforce the covenant not to compete.  Employers do have a back-up plan, however.  Recent cases illustrate that the court will enforce agreements not to solicit customers and clients after termination.  These cases also illustrate that courts will look to the nature of the contacts with clients or employees to determine if there is a breach of a non-solicitation provision.

In Corporate Technologies Inc. v. Harnett, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against a former employee of Corporate Technologies Inc. and his new employer.  The preliminary injunction restricted the employee from doing business with certain customers of Corporate Technologies with whom he worked during his employment, and required the new employer to withdraw bids which the employee prepared during his employment with the new employer.  The First Circuit court noted that the district court was specifically applying the non-solicitation and not the non-compete provisions of the agreement.  Accordingly, both courts engaged in a discussion of the applicable requirements for the entry of a preliminary injunction (which are the same under Massachusetts and Pennsylvania law).  Notably, the First Circuit did not engage in a discussion of the reasonableness of the geographic or temporal scope of the agreement, or whether the employer had a “protectable interest” served by the non-solicitation provision.  The district court found that the employee breached the non-solicitation provisions of the agreement, and the First Circuit affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction.