By Thomas P. Donnelly, Esquire

Reprinted with permission from the November 23, 2015 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2015 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

A high business “tide” does not necessarily float all boats.  Often, when business is good and profits increasing, a business owner’s desire to avoid sharing those increasing profits with an underperforming partner can create an irreconcilable divide; particularly in the case of a partner not intimately involved in the day to day operations of the business.  Similarly, more difficult economic times stress cash flow, and may motivate a performing partner to explore options to decrease or eliminate that portion of the business income flowing to those performing at a lower level.  Of course, the lesser performing partner generally adopts a contrary perspective.  In either case, the divergence between two or more partners can render the status quo unacceptable and threaten the business as a going concern.

In approaching disputes among shareholders several factors must be considered.  First, does the attorney represent the company, the majority interest, or the minority interest?  The practitioner’s potential strategies must be informed by the relative position of the parties.  Second, what are the respective goals of the parties?  Certainly, the long term goal of extracting the most gain in income or the value of the investment is the goal of all the parties, but short terms strategies can have a dramatic and sometimes unintended consequence.  Third, what is the impact of the potential short term strategies, not only on the business, but also on the individuals?   Financing arrangements and personal guarantees must be considered.  Finally, the respective rights and obligations of the shareholders post dissolution must guide the process.

When approached by a client considering business divorce, the attorney must consider potential conflicts of interest.  Often, the majority owner’s first call is to corporate counsel.  However, Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 bear upon whether corporate counsel can represent the interests of only one shareholder/member.  In summary, representation of the “company” in the same or substantially related matter, or receipt of confidential information which may bear upon the representation of the party not seeking to be represented by corporate counsel, would preclude corporate counsel from undertaking the representation of a single shareholder/member. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the company to have separate counsel, such as where the company is a potential defendant in litigation commenced by either a third party or a shareholder.  However, such representation is complicated by divergence among board members and can present difficult issues in corporate governance and communication between counsel and the corporate client.

Representation of the majority interest provides for the implementation of whatever remedies may be available under the terms of written agreements among the shareholders or by means of corporate action as to a non-performer.   Significantly, there is no statutory right or method for the involuntary removal of a shareholder (arguably, such a remedy may be available in a partnership or Limited Liability Company setting).  Potential courses of action include severance of employment or reduction in employment benefits for the non-performer, voluntary dissolution if provided and appropriate pursuant to the agreements between the parties, and modification of corporate governance.  Of course, such potential courses of action do not come without risk, and the potential for litigation alleging minority oppression should be anticipated.  In such a case, documentation of non-performance and job duties is compelling.           

Representation of the minority owner is more difficult.  Many times, the minority owner is left with litigation alternatives such as actions for the appointment of a custodian or liquidating receiver pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S.A. Sections 1767 or 1985, respectively.  While these litigation remedies can be compelling, it should not be expected that litigation would result in continuation of the status quo indefinitely. Litigation rarely restores a broken relationship. Further, as recently noted by the United States District Court in Spina v. Refrigeration Service and Engineering, Inc. 2014 WL 4632427, a shareholder seeking the appointment of a receiver or a custodian bears a heavy burden and such appointment is at the discretion of the Court.

In addition, litigation alternatives necessarily incorporate business risk.  Can the company survive the appointment of a custodian? By definition, a custodian is designed to continue the business as opposed to liquidation.  The impact of a custodian on customer relationships, the entity’s capacity to contract and the willingness of business partners to engage in long term planning or projects may render liquidation inevitable. Certainly, the appointment of a custodian or receiver results in a loss of control on the part of the shareholders.  All policy and management decisions fall within the purview of the court appointee.  Such loss of control can be particularly problematic as it pertains to the case of tax reporting. 

That same loss of control must be considered in a liquidation scenario.  Liquidation contemplates an orderly winding down and distribution of assets which should be anticipated to include intellectual property and customer lists in addition to any fixed or hard assets possessed by the entity.  As noted in Spina, liquidation is generally carried out by public auction so as to ensure fairness among shareholders.  In the event of a liquidating receiver, a marketing campaign designed to enhance the value of the assets and maximize the selling price should be anticipated.  In such circumstance, neither party may be in a position to acquire the liquidated assets or may be forced to over-pay, thereby rendering such acquisition economically unfeasible.  Accordingly, while the goal at the outset of a liquidation proceeding may be to force a buy out of a shareholder, the end result may be that no party is in a position to acquire assets and engage in continued business operations.

The impact of a custodian or receivership on the individual business owners must also be considered.  Business owners frequently guaranty corporate debt.  The commencement of an action for the appointment of a custodian or receiver is almost always defined as an event of default with regard to the entity’s financing arrangements and could also trigger liability under the personal guaranty.

Finally, post liquidation obligations, or the lack thereof, should also be considered.  It should be anticipated that former partners would compete post liquidation.  The liquidation of the entity by definition precludes any claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the company to the extent based on post liquidation acts or omissions and any right to enforce a post termination of employment restriction against competition.  However, arguably, the sale of the entity’s assets, including confidential information such as customer lists, may implicate the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and preclude use of information known to the shareholders in competition with the buyer.  While no case decided under Pennsylvania law addresses the application of the Act to such circumstance, the Act appears to be applicable where a shareholder retains possession of information which was subject to transfer in liquidation.
The complexities of business divorce through litigation mandate that the parties consider and pursue all avenues of amicable dissolution and consider all proposals for voluntary consolidation of ownership before pursuing litigation with uncertain results. 

Tom Donnelly is a Partner with Antheil, Maslow & MacMinn. His practice focuses primarily on commercial litigation and transactions, employment disputes and personal injury.  

In Roman v. McGuire Memorial, the Pennsylvania Superior Court announced a new basis for challenging terminations of at-will employees.  While Pennsylvania law has always recognized a “public policy” exception to at-will employment, the case law has limited that exception.  Roman expands the exception to include terminations of health-care workers who refuse to work mandatory overtime.
 
Roman worked as a direct care worker, subject to McGuire Memorial’s mandatory overtime requirement.  She was an at-will employee.  The mandatory overtime policy allowed for termination of employees who refused to work mandatory overtime on four occasions. McGuire terminated Roman’s employment after her (disputed) fourth refusal, and Roman sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  After a nonjury trial, the trial court found in Roman’s favor, awarded her $121,869.93 in back pay and lost benefits, and ordered reinstatement to her former position.
 
Relevant to the dispute is Pennsylvania’s Prohibition of Excessive Overtime Act (43 P.S. § 932.1 et seq.).  The Act prohibits a health care facility from requiring employees to work in excess of an “agreed to or previously determined and regularly scheduled daily work shift.”  43 P.S. § 932.3(a)(1).  Further, the Act prohibits retaliation against an employee who refuses to accept work in excess of those limitations.  43 P.S. § 932.3(b).  The Act does not provide for a remedy for employees terminated in violation of its requirements.  It does contemplate a regulatory scheme to address complaints by employees, but those regulations are not yet final.
 
The Superior Court held that the Act established a public policy that healthcare facilities should not require its direct care workers to work overtime hours, and, as such, Roman’s termination for refusing to work overtime hours amounted to wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  Further, the Court distinguished cases in which it had refused to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine because a statute had already created a remedial scheme to address violations of the particular policy identified in that statute, such as the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.  In the case of the Prohibition of Excessive Overtime in Health Care Act, there existed no remedial scheme to address the wrong.
 
The Superior Court has thus used The Act to identify a new public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.  Health care entities should be mindful of this exception in creating and enforcing overtime policies for direct care workers.